



Security and Defence Consultation Paper

Updated August 2011

The Scottish Democratic Alliance (SDA) seeks to consult with other independence minded parties and concerned individuals about the future plans for Scotland's naval, land and air defence, security against internal subversion and terrorism, and for border and immigration control.

Contents:

Introduction.....	2
The Changing Security Situation.....	2
Internal Security	3
Command Structure	4
External Security.....	5
International Security Co-operation.....	5
Defence	6
Scottish Defence Force.....	6
Procurement	9
Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief.....	9
Scotland's Share of UK Assets	10

Introduction

Since the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has taken on a whole new range of meanings.

The danger of a major global war has receded, but it has been replaced by a whole series of local armed conflicts, as well as other threats to security such as terrorism, the illegal arms trade, organised international crime, the illicit drug trade and trafficking in persons, and mass uncontrolled migration amongst others.

There is no longer any clear demarcation between internal and external security.

We should therefore be under no illusion that an 'Age of Gold' has arrived, in the absence of large-scale war. Scotland must have the forces, both civilian and military, equipped to deal with any threats, within a global system of co-operation, because there can be no security for any country, however large and powerful, in the midst of an insecure world.

The whole system of countering threats to national and international security is of necessity changing, mainly because the nature of the threats themselves have changed. Scotland must therefore adapt to these new realities, and plan accordingly.

The Changing Security Situation

Scotland's security and defence are now a matter of global strategy, and can be assured only through worldwide co-operation.

The prime examples are the '9/11' terrorist attacks on the US World Trade Centre and Pentagon in September 2001, which were planned and organised from a number of centres over four continents.

Even the sort of 'home-grown' terrorism that has reared its ugly head here within recent years usually has some kind of international link, usually in the form of religious or political fanaticism, which spans continents.

The international aspects are also seen in the illicit drug supply, which is firmly in the hands of trans-national organised crime.

Illegal immigration, which is creating havoc with our social security, education and employment policies, is also a global problem, one that cannot be resolved nationally.

This accumulation demands a reappraisal of Scotland's security and defence needs from first principles.

The actual size and composition of the required civilian/military land, sea and air forces, plus equipment, can be ascertained only after a comprehensive assessment of current threats and future security requirements. It is assumed that the tasks entrusted to our security forces will also include foreign military assignments under UN auspices, fishery protection, air-sea rescue, international disaster relief, operations against drug and weapon smugglers, and other incidents arising, many of which will involve close civilian/military co-operation.

Purely on the military side, public opinion in Scotland is in general totally opposed to weapons of mass destruction (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear). A constitutional ban should therefore be imposed in Scotland on all CBRN weapons, possibly including other weapons such as the illegal anti-personnel land mines scattered indiscriminately in zones of conflict which have continued to murder and maim innumerable civilians long after the particular conflict has ended.

Scotland should sign the relevant international treaties outlawing them.

There must be close co-operation in the international efforts to prevent the spread of these weapons, as well as their ballistic carrier systems.

The Trident submarine-carried ballistic missile system is already past its phasing-out date and no longer has any conceivable strategic value. When it is removed the Faslane base can be converted to non-nuclear Scottish requirements.

Internal Security

Scotland must continue with, and indeed step up, the existing close co-operation on security issues with Interpol, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and other international non-military security agencies.

We need to have particularly close co-ordination with England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Ireland over the entire spectrum of security issues such as illegal immigration, drug-running, money laundering, smuggling of persons and so on. There must be no unilateral action (e.g. entry to the Schengen system of open frontiers) except in agreement with the other UK partners.

The SDA therefore consider that before Independence Day there should be negotiations with Westminster, NATO and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), drafting out mutually acceptable defence and security treaties, ready for assent when Scotland resumes its sovereignty.

The establishment of a National Security Council to co-ordinate the activities of the various Scottish law enforcement and security organisations is an essential step towards ensuring the effectiveness of the Scottish security forces at home, as well as enhancing their vital links with foreign national agencies and the relevant international organisations. Such innovative approaches are necessary in order to cope with organised international crime. To deal with the different prevailing environments we will need to have two separate, but interactive, primary organisations in order to ensure the correct balance of skills and response capabilities, *viz*:-

One:

Land based potential threats: which could include terrorism; internal subversion; civil unrest; cyberspace crime; illegal immigration; organised crime; human trafficking; drug trafficking, vandalism, money laundering, petty crime, and of course natural disasters such as flood damage and search and rescue operations.

The primary agency at the frontline of response on land should be the Police, dealing with and co-ordinating various supporting agencies to identify, counter and/or contain the various security issues. The Scottish Police and Information and Coordination Centre (S-PICC) would coordinate with other agencies including Special Branch, Interpol, Intelligence agencies, Coastguard, Customs and Border control, NHS/Ambulance services; interacting as appropriate at international as well as national and local level.

In a country of Scotland's size, in an emergency, it would perhaps be more practical, and cost effective, to utilise the regular and part-time armed forces to supplement the civilian agencies.

The SDA suggest that the armed forces of Scotland should be trained to assist the police and local government in a range of supporting functions, such as environmental and natural disaster response, counter terrorism, and search and rescue. To provide a timely response, this implies that there needs to be a significantly greater dispersal of both the regular and part-time units of the army throughout Scotland than is currently the practice.

Two:

Maritime based potential threats: which will probably include fishery protection, maritime habitat protection, oil and gas installation protection, pipeline and power cable protection, offshore energy asset protection, oil pollution, waste pollution, maritime disaster, drug trafficking, illegal immigration etc.

Maritime Agencies - at present a number of different government agencies provide a range of specialist functions within Scotland's maritime zone.

The SDA suggest that all government maritime agencies outwith the armed forces should combine their functions and responsibilities under one umbrella organisation to be known as the Coastguard Service.^[1] This would reduce overheads, and provide a more effective, interlinked use of the available assets.

The proposed **Coastguard Service** should be based on a Centralised data and Information exchange and liaison Centre (CIC) which would oversee the operation of a distributed network of local Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs), each MRCC providing local co-ordination of the maritime assets for fishery protection, counter pollution, counter drug trafficking, salvage, inshore rescue assets, customs and ship inspection.

For maritime incidents each MRCC would co-ordinate the necessary liaison and support from the Police, Fire and Rescue services, Ambulance Service, Health Service, RNLI, Air surveillance and Rescue assets, Civil Defence units, Military assets and relevant private agencies, including the media, etc.

Coastguard Assets - the Coastguard Offshore Patrol vessels would initially consist of vessels currently operating within the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency and vessels transferred as part of the negotiated settlement with the UK. It is proposed that in Coastguard Service the vessels should be armed with self defence weapons. The current shore based assets would continue to be utilised as part of the joint coastguard/ police response.

Potential **aerospace security** threats exist in Scotland as elsewhere in the world. Our airports and aircraft have been targeted, and as a result the airport authorities, police and government have evolved significant precautions to protect passengers and freight. The police, by working with Special Branch, have integrated domestic and international intelligence services as part of the security network and as previously mentioned, this international co-operation must be continued.

There is also a need for **air assets** in the form of fixed wing aircraft (manned and unmanned) and medium sized helicopters to provide for maritime and land based Surveillance and Search and Rescue (SAR) operations, operating as assets of the coastguard service. The helicopters could also be tasked to provide Emergency Medical Services.

The police also have a need for surveillance and monitoring aircraft, which could also be tasked for SAR operations when necessary.

Command Structure

To provide an effective response to any situation outwith the norm, there must be a structured approach to data collection, evaluation, and presentation, to ensure that all the relevant facts are available to the appropriate level of decision-makers.

The following is proposed:-

That there should be a **National Security Council** (NSC) created to provide the highest level of decision-making, and to be accountable to Parliament for all aspects of the security and defence of Scotland. The NSC, chaired by the First Minister, should be comprised of the heads of the principal security and defence organisations.

To effectively co-ordinate all aspects of national security, a Scottish **National Security Response Centre** (NSRC) should be established to collect, evaluate and present all relevant situational information from all of the public and voluntary security and response organisations.

The NSRC would be responsible for providing the NSC with a comprehensive, real-time, situational overview of the current security picture. The NSRC should also be the primary conduit for relaying executive orders from the NSC.

The NSRC could be comprised of a **Computerised Command, Control and Communications Centre (C4C)** to co-ordinate and network all government, security and defence organisations, as well as relevant volunteer and private health and social care bodies.

The NSRC should be set up to link, and to network, primarily by electronic communication, designated representatives of the National Government, Judiciary, Media, Police, Coastguard, Armed Forces, Civil and Military Intelligence, Regional Councils, COSLA, SEPA, Electric Power distribution grid, Port Authorities, Scottish Water, and other interested public and private organisations.

The combination of representatives networked at any one time would be relevant to the emergency or situation.

The NSRC should also be networked to international agencies through the security organisations, utilising their normal contacts

Co-operation

Within all government, volunteer, and private professional organisations and bodies there should be identified suitable persons, available at all times, and designated to respond and act as conduits between the NSRC and their parent organisation.

Each administrative region would require a **Regional Security Response Committee (RSRC)** to co-ordinate, on a regional and local basis, in a similar manner to the NSRC, with a network of designated appointees.

The RSRC to be linked to the NSRC.

The RSRC to be normally chaired by the Provost/chief executive of the region.

External Security

With the constantly increasing integration of a globalised world, currently there are few direct threats to Scotland likely, at least of a forcible nature emanating from abroad. Scotland must nevertheless seek membership of international organisations that provide cast-iron guarantees of its national security and territorial integrity.

In this context there is no substitute for the **North Atlantic Treaty Organisation**, which for half a century has served the free world well, and in its new role will help secure world peace in the future. NATO, in co-operation with the **United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime**, remains the spearhead for operations against international terrorism. NATO's **Partnership for Peace** and its **Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council** also encompass a whole range of non-member and neutral countries, including Russia.

Diplomatically, perhaps the most essential source of security is the **Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe**, which in fact surrounds the entire northern hemisphere, literally from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The diplomacy of the OSCE played a key role in ending the Cold War. It has drastically reduced the size of military forces and the amount of military hardware in Europe, and has complemented NATO operations on many occasions in the Balkans and elsewhere. Here, too, Scottish membership is essential.

International Security Co-operation

Defence treaties and agreements between Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, NATO and the OSCE should be negotiated and be prepared ready for assent on resumption of sovereignty.

These peace treaties should set out the terms and protocols for collaboration between the signature states and organisations; and must include provision for Scotland to be provided with access to high level regional and international intelligence, including contractual access to satellite military surveillance.

It would also be in Scotland's interests to negotiate the terms and protocols which will apply when Scots resources are deployed on UN, OSCE and NATO activities. There could also be agreement on the sharing of the degree, type and location of training of Scots, and allied peace treaty forces, as Scotland can provide a wide range of location options.

Holyrood must retain the option to determine whether, when, or where Scots forces would be deployed overseas. For example, it is unlikely that the Scots would have agreed to go into the war with Iraq or the incursion into Afghanistan.

Defence

Although there are unlikely to be many direct threats to Scotland of a forcible nature emanating from abroad, there must always be awareness of the threat potential, which could arise as a result of inadequate natural resources, like water, food and energy, facing ever expanding populations.

As a nation, Scotland is well endowed with ample natural resources and for this and other security reasons, the Scots should be prepared to demonstrate their willingness to protect these resources in collaboration with our peace treaty allies.

Scotland will therefore require to have armed forces able to augment the internal security agencies, and, in time, to participate in international operations supporting world peace.

The SDA suggest that there should be one integrated **Scottish Defence Force** (SDF) comprising specialist elements including intelligence, army, naval and air defence units.

Civil Oversight: The SDF must be accountable to the Scottish Parliament, operating under the authority of a Scottish Ministry of Defence (SMOD). The Defence Minister, a member of the Cabinet, should be responsible for a Strategic Defence Plan, the defence expenditure and the functioning of the SMOD and the SDF.

It is likely that the initial assets for equipping the SDF will primarily be those transferred as negotiated under Scotland's paid up share of the current UK armed forces' assets. It is also likely that following peace treaties with England and NATO there will collaboration on such aspects as intelligence and training.

Initially, for the SDF, there would be a need to develop a command, control and communications networked centre in Scotland, which could be linked to the General Headquarters in England and the other NATO command and control centres. Over time it would be necessary for Scotland to develop its own General Headquarters capability, and training facilities as well as procure long range early warning and surveillance systems.

Scottish Defence Force

Volunteers

It should be expected that the SDF would be an all volunteer force - either regular or part-time. They should however be paid a wage and have terms of employment comparable to the general public, added payment being given when operating under hostile conditions. Travel to and from overseas deployment should not be classed as leave and all health treatment and care should be inclusive.

Command Structure

The command structure of the SDF should consist of one integrated command headquarters networked with the individual headquarters of the dispersed regular and part time army, naval and air defence units and with the NSRC.

SDF - Army

The SDA propose that the most practical, socially acceptable and economically viable form of land force (army) would be a dispersed volunteer regular and part-time (territorial) army based on our traditional units. Such a system could also supply economic benefits in rural areas.

The SDA suggest that taken overall, a balanced all-arms force based on distributed infantry units, supported by engineer, light artillery, air defence, medical, signals, logistics, transport and reconnaissance units would be best placed to serve Scottish defence interests.

As a rough guide it currently costs between £20 to £40 million per year to operate with a conventional infantry battalion of about 500 persons. Consideration should be given to modelling our army units on the Swiss army, to provide effective forces at significantly less cost.

Although it is likely that a small number of tanks and heavy weapons would be required for training purposes, large formation and specialist training could initially be conducted outwith Scotland under the defence treaties with our allies. The defence treaties could include provision for reciprocal training facilities to be made available in the north and south of Scotland for our defence allies, providing local economic benefits.

A limited number of mine protected armoured vehicles would eventually be required to outfit our overseas deployed forces during humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

SDF - Navy

Located at a strategic crossroads connecting the Atlantic Ocean, the North Sea, the Baltic and the Norwegian Sea, Scotland is in a vital geopolitical location, ideally placed to assist our allies to protect essential commercial shipping routes and the future development of the Arctic waters.

To complement the lightly armed coastguard vessels there will be a need to develop a coastal defence system to protect key seaways and estuaries together with the capability to protect our seaways from mines and submarines.

Mine Countermeasures

There would therefore be a need for mine countermeasures assets around all our coastal areas. Consideration should therefore be given to developing a mine counter-measures capability.

Anti-submarine Operations

Similarly there shall be a need for an anti-submarine capability.

Helicopters

Consideration must be given to the development of a multi-role helicopter force to augment surface vessel capability.

Submarine Assets

Consideration should also be given to the future procurement of a diesel submarine force as the most cost-effective and potent means of protecting our littoral waters - licence built in Scotland.

Marines

To protect Scotland's offshore assets, multiple island communities and for boarding duties on coastguard vessels some of our forces must consist of at least one battalion of Marines.

Multi-role Support

When we are ready to participate in NATO and UN overseas operations there would be a need to consider how to supply and support our troops. Initially our troops could be flown out to

the operational areas but the most cost effective means of supporting them with needed vehicles and supplies would be a multi-role support vessel such as a Bay class Landing Ship dock, with an expanded medical facility.

SDF - Air Defence

With Scotland's significant land and marine territory there is a need for **Fast Jet Fighter** capability to respond to incursions into our aerospace and to provide surveillance and protection of our maritime resources.

Consideration will be necessary as to the provision of an **Air Early Warning** (AEW) capability, by airborne and or land assets. In the short term, AEW capability could be contracted from NATO partners, with a land based or air based capability to be acquired in the future. Consideration should also be given to the provision of a Medium Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Air Vehicle (MALE-UAV) (commonly called a Drone) system for surveillance.

It is proposed therefore that as a minimum there should be at least one squadron of fast response jets, comprising operational plus maintenance and attrition aircraft. There would be a need for a primary base and at least three forward bases - this would benefit the local economy. The primary base would also require a base defence force. Suitable aircraft currently existing could include Typhoons, F15s or Gripen NGs.

There would also be a need for an advanced training capability with such as the Hawk 128 trainer. This capability could be retained as a domestic resource, or as part of an integrated defence treaty with England or as part of the European Joint Training scheme.

To provide basic training and as an aircraft for the University flights there will need to be agreement on the handover of the current assets used for this purpose.

It is likely that there will be a need for transport aircraft such as the Hercules C130J, and Chinook Helicopters for regional transport needs; and for commercial long range transports when Scotland wishes to participate in overseas humanitarian deployments. Also included in the defence treaties therefore could be terms for contract use of the Westminster operated Multi-role Tanker Transport aircraft.

Special Forces

To assist the security forces to combat the well funded and well armed terrorist organisations consideration should be given to the establishment of a Special Forces unit, including consideration for the provision of helicopters to enable rapid response.

Cadets

The current system of army, naval and air cadet schemes should be encouraged and supported.

Training

Where practical, all basic training should be carried out in Scotland. Initially, specialized military skills training may not be available in Scotland, and therefore there would be a requirement for such training to be contracted out under collaboration arrangements with allies, under negotiated defence treaties.

In addition to providing military skills, it would be in the national interests to provide both the regular and part-time personnel with a civilian recognised skill or qualification, which could be used in civilian employment.

Veterans

The Defence Minister should have a duty of care for all veterans; in particular those who have suffered mental and or physical impairment. They, and their families, must be supported until they are fully recovered or are put to rest.

Procurement

Sovereign Scotland will be able to fund the personnel and equipment resources necessary to support Scots security and defence operations. The security and defence resources available to Scotland should be comparable to those of the Scandinavian countries, which are similar as regards population size, geographical terrain and territorial waters.

Current SDA fiscal analysis suggest that for the first two years, sovereign Scotland will be in a position to provide some £1500 million per year for Coastguard and Armed Forces operational expenses. Additionally there is the likelihood that some £1000 million per year will be available for capital expenditure. These are provisional projections for the first two years.

The most cost effective use of the security and defence funding would be by means of centralised procurement systems. The police, coastguard and the armed forces could each have access to a centralised system for procuring and evaluating fit for purpose major equipment items.

The system should generally operate on a two tier basis with the central unit setting up contracts from which the regional forces would procure standard equipment, with domestic, housekeeping and food disposable stores being purchased locally wherever possible; payment being made from the regional or unit cost centre budgets.

As an Independent Scotland would not be a member of the EU, current rules and regulations about European-wide tenders would no longer be applicable. Home based procurement should therefore be mandatory wherever possible, with major assets such as the coastguard vessels being built, fitted out and maintained in Scotland. .

Where foreign procurement is necessary then all such contracts should be negotiated with offset deals to the value of the contract.

Commercial and Civilian Support

Scotland's current share of defence expenditure is less than a quarter of the expenditure we should expect, considering the revenues we provide to the UK Treasury. In a sovereign Scotland we must develop a security and defence procurement policy which will ensure that the maintenance of our assets is carried out in Scotland. Where new major assets are acquired then they should either be built in Scotland or offset deals be arranged to provide equivalent job opportunities in Scotland.

Scotland possesses several highly developed military bases, such as Faslane, Kilsyth, Leuchars, Lossiemouth, Machrihanish and others. These represent established assets of significant potential value to their local communities as well as nationally. We also currently provide training areas such as the bombing and artillery testing ranges at Cape Wrath, Tain, Benbecula, Kirkudbright and Luce Bay to NATO partners at almost no return to ourselves. Current speculation as to their future deployment should be viewed positively with regard to both their military and commercial potential value.

Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief

The Scots are a compassionate and charitable people, and nowhere is this more clearly seen than our impressive response to disasters both at home and abroad. Our medical and rescue teams have a well deserved and valued reputation, due to their demonstrated professionalism and experience, participating either as part of government sponsored activities or as part of voluntary agencies.

Funding for humanitarian aid and disaster relief should, as now, be provided from government sources together with voluntary contributions from the public and private organisations and charities, personnel also being provided by both government and private sources.

During humanitarian aid, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations under a United Nations mandate, the deployed Scots armed forces or civilian humanitarian aid teams would come under the operational control of the designated UN or NATO mobile command centre, subject to agreed protocols of engagement. Alternatively, the Scots personnel would be responsible to the host state when providing aid to a sovereign state.

In anticipation of continued participation in future humanitarian and disaster relief operations sovereign Scotland should consider the means by which personnel and their equipment can be delivered to a disaster location.

To provide an initial response in the vital period immediately after a disaster, consideration should be given to setting up a contract for civilian aircraft to be available for transporting the disaster relief personnel at short notice. An alternative may be to contract for a share of the military transport aircraft operated by our defence treaty allies.

Consideration should also be given to acquiring a suitable surface vessel to transport equipment and supplies and to act as a support base for personnel. The vessel should also be fitted with a medical facility. One of the UK's current Bay class Landing Ship Dock may be most be suitable for this purpose.

Scotland's Share of UK Assets

With 8.6% of the population of the UK, Scots based resources currently contribute over 10% of the revenues received by the UK treasury. On this basis, Scotland owns a paid up share of the total assets of the UK government. This includes a paid up share of all UK defence assets. Sovereign Scotland is unlikely to need any of the major weapon defence assets but would be entitled to a share of overall defence assets.

The SDA suggest that there is a need to determine a list of defence assets which Scotland will require as part of the negotiated severance from the UK^[2]

The SDA also propose that the ownership of all the current land and sea based UK MOD property and fixed assets in Scotland must be transferred to Scotland on resumption of sovereignty.

Footnotes:

- [1] Coastguard service Assets at present are inadequate to monitor and provide effective enforcement across the extensive Scottish EEZ.
- Search and Rescue along our coasts has been carried out by a combination of fast response coastguard assets, the RNLI and the police. The SDA believe that these services should continue, however we also consider that the RNLI should be 50 % government funded.
- It is proposed that there be five Coastguard regional centres, and that the mobile assets be on a four tier level to complement the current inshore capability.
- Tier 1** The coast and island areas be divided into coast watch areas, with (designated) local fishermen, familiar with their own waters, local vessel and coastline areas, reporting any suspicious activity on unknown vessels to the regional coastguard centres.
- Tier 2** There should be an inshore squadron of high speed shallow draft multi-role vessels to provide a fast reaction patrol for fishery protection, search and rescue and counter drug trafficking.
- A suitable type vessel would be the Austal Multi-role Catamaran or the MV Triton catamaran - these vessels to be built under licence in Scotland. Equipped with surveillance and search radar and electro-optical systems, networked communications connectivity, two high-speed RHIBs, one light cannon and two HMGs and helicopter capable.
- Tier 3** Consideration for the protection of our offshore assets to be carried out by a squadron of contracted Multi-role Offshore Support Vessels - to provide for Oil and Gas installation protection, offshore energy asset protection, emergency towing capability, counter oil pollution capability, emergency evacuation, search and rescue assets including two fast rescue craft.

These vessels could be based on the design of offshore MSVs of some 3200TFL displacement, currently servicing our offshore assets. Such vessels could be on contract until replacements are built under licence in Scotland. Capable of a wide range of support functions they could when required be capable of being deployed with marines, helicopter and fast RHIBs. Armament could include one light cannon and two HMGs. When not required for coastguard duties these vessels could provide a commercial service. An alternative would be to build additional "River" class OPVs – again under licence in Scotland.

Tier 4 With the loss of the Nimrod MPAs, the two/three surveillance aircraft available require to be supplemented by at least ten turboprop maritime surveillance aircraft (manned and unmanned) equipped with radar and electro-optic turret systems to provide continuous surveillance and monitoring of the extensive Scottish Exclusive Economic zone (EEZ).

Suitable manned aircraft could be Hercules C130s or Casa C295 maritime surveillance aircraft similar to those in use by Portugal and other nations. These aircraft could be serviced or even built under licence in Scotland.

[2] Scotland will have no need for nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious warships, main battle tanks, self propelled artillery, etc - yet we have paid our share and are part owners of these systems. Therefore we should consider negotiating our share of these weapons of aggression for systems necessary for self-defence and for use in humanitarian aid and disaster relief.

Land assets required:

- Arms, equipment, transport and stores for 20,000 personnel.
- Transport and surveillance helicopters.

Marine assets required, together with associated spares and equipment:

- One Bay Class Landing Ship dock.
- One Type 45 destroyer.
- Two Type 23 ASW Frigates.
- Three River Class OPVs.
- Six Sandown class MCMVs.
- One Echo Class survey vessel.
- Two Nesbitt class survey craft.
- Two LCU 10s.
- Six LCVP Mk 5s.
- Ten Merlin HC HM Mk1s.
- Ten Lynx HMA8s.
- Four Archer class training ships.
- Two Customs and Excise OPVs.
- Twenty RHIBs.
- Various harbour and range, tugs and handling vessels.

Aerospace Assets required:

- Thirty-two Typhoon Fast Jets.
- Twelve Hawk 128 trainers.
- Twenty Basic trainers.
- Two Twin turboprop trainers.
- Ten Hercules C130Js.
- Three Airbus A330 MRTTs.
- Two Airbase defence unit assets.
- Two Airbase support unit assets.

For further information contact:- info@scottishdemocraticalliance.org.uk

© **Scottish Democratic Alliance 2010**

The text in this document may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium, on condition that it is reproduced accurately, and not used in a misleading context. Any material so used must be acknowledged as SDA copyright, and the title of the document specified.

Where we have identified any third party material within our text, you may require to obtain specific reproduction permission from the copyholders concerned.